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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
on the strengthening of relations between the European Union and Chile In· Jtme  1994  the Corfu  European  Council  discussed  relations  betw.een  the  European . 
·union and Latin America and its regional organizatiofl:S; Jt.  called on ~he Commission to 
put proposals to the Council aimed at strengthening relations with Mercosur and. Me?cico  . 
but made no mention of  Chile. 
Of all  the Latin American countries, Chile has always underlined its close links with the 
European Community because of  cultural, political and economic similarities. In July 1994 
it presented a non-paper clearly indicating the Chilean goveriunent's intention to improve 
its relations with the EU ~y stepping outside the cooperation agreement framework and 
ruming for an association agreement involving the creation of a free-trade area between 
· the European Community an<;i Chile.  · 
In November the  Council  noted  with  satisfaction  Chile's .interest  in  strengthening  its 
bilateral relations with the Union  ar..1  its preference for an open form of  regionalism~ It 
welcomed its proposals for an association with  M~rcosur  wit~  ·a view to establishing a 
free.;. trade area.·  .  I  . 
The Council accordingly decided to review the EUs relations with Chile during the first 
quarter of  this year on the basis of  a Commission eval~ationreport. .  · 
In this context the EU~  response to the non~paper (presented by the troika to the ~hilean 
Foreign Minister in  December)  signalled the EUs readiness for  a  more comprehensive 
dialogue with Chile with scope for further development. 
The Essen European Council· of December 1994 confirmed its willingness to 'establish a 
new  and  'extended  partnership  between  the  European Uruon  and  the  Latin  American 
countrie_s and urged the Commission and the Council "to put ideas on the future form of 
treaty relations with Mexico  and on the extension of relatiOJ?.S  with Chile into  concrete 
form". 
This commumcation from the Commission to the Council and  Parli~ment has been drawn 
up in response to the requests of  the European Council and the Council: it (a) assesses the· 
current situation and trends in Chile and  e~amines the couiltry's· foreign relations and (b) 
presents strategic options for extending the scope ofEU-Chile relations.  · 
1 I.  CHILE: CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS 
I.l  The Chilean model of  economic development 
In  March  1994  the  second  CDP  (Concertaci6n  de  los  Partidos  por  Ia  bemocracia) 
government confirmed the success of the democratic transition and the consolidation of 
the parliamentary system.  The parties which make up the political spectrum of the CDP 
(socialist, Christian Democrats and other centre groups) have a strong majority over the 
right-wing opposition. Recent political trends point to a future with two main, increasingly 
similar, electoral coalitions. 
The  absence  of political  conflict  over the  central  issue  in  Chile  - management  of the 
economy- encourages national consensus.  Chile has a freely operating market economy. 
The government's role is  to oil  the system's wheels and  correct any adverse economic, 
·social or environmental effects arising from industrial development, market economics and 
structural under-development. The Chilean economic system and its institutional structure 
are now comparable to those of  OECD countries.  · 
The fact that the Chilean economic system operates on the basis of  competitive productive 
activity and  orthodox macroeconomic management is  a clear indication of the country's 
progress along the_path of  long-term growth. 
With  a  population of 14  million,  Chile  is  a  typical  small,  open  economy  with  exports 
which absorb about a third ofproduction (in  1993 they absorbed 27.8% at current prices 
and 3  6. 2% at  1990 prices) and a modest tariff barrier in the form of  a single external tariff 
of11%. 
In this open trade environment, the private sector in Chile has demonstrated its capacity 
for initiative and the entrepreneurial spirit has flourished. 
! 
Savings  and  investment levels are currently the highest in Latin America (over 26% of 
GDP, against  18% in  Latin America overall), reflecting private capital's response to the 
market opportunities offered by the Chilean economic system. 
Public  savings  (4.2%  of GDP  in  1994) 
1 outstrip  public  investment.  The  Chilean 
government has thus managed to establish a budget surplus (  +  1.3% in  1994) enabling it to 
reduce public debt, which at the end oflast year was some 31% of  GOP. 
Discipline has also been maintained in monetary policy, which is  managed independently 
by the Chilean Central Bank. Although inflation remains quite high, this is due to legally- · 
mandated indexing systems which make wages and pricing somewhat inflexible.  Inflation 
rates have, nevertheless fallen steadily in the last few years, from 25% in  1990 to 8.9% in 
1994. 
The external debt, excluding reserves, was USD 17 billion in  1990, dropping to USD 8. 7 
billion  in  1994.  In  1990  debt  servici{lg  costs  were  equivalent  to  17.2%  of exports, 
dropping to 7.8% ih 1994. 
2 It is  worth noting  here  that the Chilean  eeonomy ·has  been  spared  the  financial  and 
monetary crisis suffered by most European economies in the first quarter of  this yeai. The . 
Chilean  currency ·has  held  its international  p~ty and  there :has  not  been  any 
11tequila 
efrect
11  on the stock market.  -
All ·these economic policy  measures  have  helped  to keep  Chile•s  growth rate relatively 
high  (6.3%  per· year at  constant prices  between  1990-94)  and  its  unemployment  level 
comparatively  low  in  the  cu_rrent  international  climate (5.6% in  1994).  Chile  is  now 
considered to be the country with the most competitive economy and. the lowest risk .level 
in Latin America. None the less, with ari. average ,per capita income ofUSD 3 400 Chile•s 
economy still faces serious problems ofunder-developrilent. Poverty remains a major issue 
and is one of  the govemment•s top priorities. 
.  .  .  . 
_Per capita, Chile has one of  the highest levels in the world of  exploitable natural economic 
· resources. It must inevitably· diversify its production system and move into manufac;tures · 
and services, at the cost of some painful restructuring.  Environmental and  information 
technologies  for  advanced.  services  are  now  considered  to  be  prime· vehicles  of· the 
country•s economic diversification.  · 
The government is constantly on the look-out for new ways of  involving the private sector 
- companies 'and civil society in general - more fully In developing infrastructure and social 
facilities. 
1.2  · Chile's economy on the world stage: open regionalis'!l , 
One of Chil~·s .  main  objectives  on  the  international  relations  front  is  to continue the 
process of  making the Chilean economy f!IOre international.  ·  ·  · 
The  main  source  of inspiration  for  this  policy  is 
110pen  regionalism",  namely  the 
negotiation of regio'nal  agreements t6 encourage trade and. investment expansion. with a 
view to the general liberalization of  world trade. 
Chile adopts a completely open position to the world, maintaining very close investment~ 
· trade and cooperation relations with the OECD countries, the rest of  Latin America and 
many countries in 'Asia.  .  ' 
*  Export/trade. 
Exports are the main driving force behind Chile•s economic  develop~ent and .natural 
resources  account  for , over  90%  of· these  exports.  There  is  a  pfirticularly  high 
concentration of primary exports to the OECD countries, while the main markets for 
Chilean exports of manufactures  and  services  are  in  Latin America,  absorbing  over 
40% of  Chilean exports of  manufactures. 
.  .  .  .  -
Between 1980 and  1994 chilean exports more than doubled .  in value (X 2. 3) to reach 
USD 11 billion.· During the same period exports to Asia· increased sevenfold, totalling · 
USD  3.5  billion,  while  exports  to  the  USA ·increased  threefold  to  reach 
USD 1.9 billion. European markets have not grown as much (they saw a 50% increase 
· between  1980  and  1994) but are .  still  very  important for  Chile.  The deGline  in  the · 
3  . relative importance of exports to Europe was particularly marked from  1990, in part 
owing  to the  deterioration  in  Chilean  terms  of trade and  the  recession  in  Europe. 
According to Eurostat data,  imports to the EU from  Chile accounted for 0.56% of 
·total  imports  in  1990  (excluding  intra-European  trade)  and  only  0.40%  in  1993, 
although certain products (see Annex III) remain sensitive. 
European producers, however, realised the potential of the Chilean market and hence 
Chile's share in  the EU's total non-Comrriunity exports rose regularly from  0.28% in 
1990 to 0.35% in  1993.  The USA,  however,  continues to be Chile's  main  supplier, 
accounting for 23% of  total imports in 1994. 
Overall, the breakdown by zones is very balanced: ;26% of  total trade in 1993 was with 
the EU, 18% with the USA, 23% with Latin America and 22% with Asia. 
The European Union remains Chile's principal trading partner. 
This balanced opening-up to the world is the main factor behind recent developments 
in  Chilean trade policy,  the main  features  of which  are a modest  level  of domestic · 
market  protection and  a systematic  search for  preferential  treatment  throughout the 
world. 
Chile did not hesitate to lower its external tariff unilaterally (from 3  0% in 1984 to 11% 
in  1990) and adopt a position in  favour of maximum  1iberalization of trade in  goods 
and services during the GATTnegotiations. Similarly in the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) context it was Chile which did the most to promote the economic 
complementarity agreements, in some cases opting for more general free-trade systems, 
particularly in  its agreements with Mexico  (1991 ),  Colombia and  Venezuela ( 1993 ), 
Argentina (1991),'Bolivia (1993) and most recently with Ecuador (1994). Negotiations 
are under way with Peru. 
' 
These  trade  agreements  with  Latin  America  have  undoubtedly  contributed  to  the 
substantial increase in trade in the last few months, above all in manufactures. 
Last year the new Chilean government decided to focus on a policy of  closer relations 
with  major  trading  blocs.  It  continued  negotiations  with  Mercosur,  considered 
membership  o( Nafta,  became  a  member  of APEC  (Asian  and  Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation Forum) and called for a new form  ofassociati~n with the EU. 
"'  Mercosur 
Membership of Mercosur's customs union would be very difficult for Chile as things 
stand because the·union's common .external tariff will  vary between 0% and  30% to 
begin  with  and .will  on  average  be  higher than  Chile's  (the idea  of raising  tariffs  is 
currently  unthinkable  for the country's  government  and  economic  operators).  Chile 
therefore intends to negotiate an association formula which would ultimately allow for 
a free-trade situation with Mercosur but maintaining the difference in the external tariff. 
4 Chile is planning to conclude an association treaty with Mercosur this year witp a view 
to  consolidating the . current  concessions  in  trade  with  Argentma  and  preferential 
. openings in  trad~ with other  member countries, and to establishing a firm :timetable for 
moves  to  free· trade.  -Recently,  however,  various  obstacles  have  held. up  the 
negotiations. 
*  Nafta 
The  agreement with Nafta (Chile,  which has  a free-trade treaty with Mexico,  could 
have negotiated. individually  with the USA but opted simply for Nafta membership) 
mainly depends ori the North American position. The negotiations have been held back 
by  the  Mexican  economic  crisis  and  domestic-policy  factors  such  as  the  new 
composition of  the US House ofRepresentatives.  · 
The· most  optimistic forecasts,  if agreement  is  reached,  are for  a  USD  115  million · 
increase in Chilean exports as a result ofUS trade openings-under Nafta. According-to 
other analysts the main effects will be felt on Chilean imports because ofthe d¢flection 
of  trade to the USA.  ·  · 
*  APEC 
I  Trade relations  with the Pacific  should  also  become stronger as  a  ~esult of APEC's 
progressive development, the aim being a free-trade area among its members by 2015. 
·Chile has begun negotiations with New Zealand with a view to .concluding a free-tnide 
treaty. 
*  European Union 
· Another facet  of Chile's  burgeoning  trade  relations  is· its  application  to the EU to 
conclude an associati9n ·agreement providing for trade liberalization between the two 
partners.  I 
.  .  ' 
Currently 82% .  of  Community imports from  Chile consist of commodities which have 
duty-free access to the European market without any restrictions on quantity: The main 
constraints on Chilean exports to Europe ·are quotas on a few agricultural products. 
The average rate of  duty on Chilean imports to the EU is 2.4% (15% of  these imports 
have until now come under the GeneraliZed  System of Preferences).'  It is clear· from 
recent trade disputes that Chilean exports have come up against more obstacles in the 
USA and Japan than on ,Community markets. 
.  I  .  .  . 
*  Foreign investment  : 
.  /  .  .  .  .  . 
Chile's progress towards a free-market economy lias been bolstered by an increase in 
direct foreign  investment.  Between  1974  arid  1994  nearly USD  12  billion  has  been 
directly invested in Chile,  ov~r half of this m  the mining sector.  Of these investments 
48.8% are from  Canada and the USA,  25.4% frorri  Europe,  14.6%_ from the Pacific 
5. 
•· region and  8.2% from  the rest of Latin America.  In the manufacturing  and  services 
sectors  alone,  European capital  accounts  for  44% of all  foreign  investment,  giving 
European firms a firm foothold in the Chilean industries of  the future. 
1.3EC-Chile cooperation 
Cooperation ties between Chile and  the EC are excellent.  The scale of the Community's 
contribution (grants) between 1990 and 1994 can be seen from the following figures: 
- European Community 
- International organizations 
-USA 
-Japan 
65.7% 
5.1% 
6.1% 
15.6% 
As a result of the 1973  coup d'etat and the. ensuing spate of human rights violations the 
Community  and  its  Member  States  distanced  themselves  from  the  Pinochet  regime. 
Relations with Chile,  however,  continued. despite its  political vicissitudes.  The EC  first 
came  to  the  support  of civil  society  in  Chile  by  providing  food  aid.  via  humanitarian 
organizations (some ECU 20 million between 1988 and  1992). The European Parliament 
then spearheaded the Community's efforts to encourage the restoration of  democracy with 
the inclusion from  1988 of a special budget heading for NGOs working in Chile and the 
creation of a new budget item to "contribute to the process of democratization in  Chile 
and Latin America", which was increased in 1993. 
These two measures helped to support activities targeted at the Chilean people, primarily 
the most  disadvantaged  groups,  and  the  "support  for  democratization"  budget  heading 
first helped Chile back on the road to democracy and then to political stability. 
The framework cooperation agreement was  signed on 20 December  1990.  It is  a third-
generation agreement which bases EC-Chile relations on respect for democratic principles 
and  human  rights  and  contains  several  new  elements.  These  include  more  detailed 
provisions' on  cooperation  in  the  field  of science  and  technology,  training  and  the 
environment.  New clauses  open  the  way  for  social  and  cultural, cooperation  and  for 
cooperation on public administration, information and communications. 
Cooperation with Chile was stepped up  in  1991, amounting to a total of some ECU 18 
million (ECU 13.2 million in  1990). In  1991  one of the main achievements in the field of 
economic  cooperation  of  mutual  interest  was  the  setting-up  of· the  "Fundaci6n 
Empresarial CE-Chile",  a centre for  economic cooperation and  technology transfer.  Its 
main task is to provide small and medium-sized enterprises with services such as technical, 
economic and financial information, disseminate know-how and technology from the EC 
and  in  general  promote  contacts  between  EU  economic  operators  and  their  Chilean 
counterparts. 
In  1992, EC-Chile cooperation totalled some ECU 25.5 million.  As  a result  of new EU 
cooperation guidelines,  the  sectoral  and  geographical  scope  of financial  and  technical 
assistance was. extended and  for  the first  time  Chile  became  eligible  for  an  integrated 
financial and technical assistance programme in its northern regions (ECU I 0 million). 
6 .  . 
From  1993  cooperation  (which  that  year  totalled  some  ECU 24  niillion) _was  mainly 
focused  on'  economic cooperation  projects  aimed  at  the  diversification  of agricultural 
exports, investment promotion, industrial and energy coope~ation and technology transfer. 
I  ',.  : 
In  1994  a  budget of  some  ECU 15 million  remained  focused  on  economic  and 
technolo~cal cooperation. At the same time three major strategic areas were established: 
·  - poverty alleviatiori, 
- continuing government reform,  _ 
- the internationalization of  the production system. 
\. 
7 .  II. FUTURE EU-CHILE RELATIONS: STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
Il.l  Economic and institutional trends 
The  overall  evaluation of recent  EU-Chile  relations  is  clearly  a  satisfactory  one.  The · 
Union enjoys  a  special  position in  Chile's  trade,  investment  and  cooperation relations. 
Cultural and economic ties are close and despite geographical distances, Chile has many 
political, economic and cultural affinities with Europe. 
However, the relative decline  in  Chilean exports to the  Community,  coupled  with the 
impression in Chile that major European firms are not investing enough in the country, has 
led many Chilean decision-makers to believe that the Community is less interested in Chile 
than it used to be no~  that democracy has returned. 
If  current trends are not corrected they could militate against the hannonious development 
of relations  with  Europe.  An  immediate  effect  of Chile's  joining  Nafta  would  be  a 
deflection of trade that would  affect European exports of capital and  consumer goods, 
even  though the.  11%  tariff barrier is  not  very  high.  Furthermore,  the development of 
closer ties with other Latin American countries, especially a link with Mercosur, will tend 
to attract Chile's non-traditional exports to the area and so reduce the relative importance 
of  the Community market for Chile's product diversification drive. 
These trends ·should n':'t be overestimated, however.  European economic operators are. 
making  their  presence felt  by  investing  in  expanding  sectors of the  Chilean  economy. 
Furthermore; the decline in the relative share of  Chilean exports in Community trade also 
stems from the increase in Chile's exports to Latin America and  Asia, which is indicative 
of  the dynamic nature of  the country's economy. 
Mercosur  and  Nafta,  by  triggering  two  simultaneous  processes  to  establish · customs 
unions and free-trade areas on the American continent at a historic moment when market-
economy systems are being widely adopted,  are offering new prospects for  integration, 
not only within North and  South America but between the two.  Both the United  States 
and Brazil have separately named 2005 as the year when a vast free-;trade area will cover 
the  whole  continent.  This  scenario  is  made  realistic  and  will  be  facilitated  by  recent 
integration developments: Nafta with Canada, the US and Mexico; the G3  with Mexico, 
Colombia and  Venezuela; the Andean Pact with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and  Colombia; 
Mercosur  with  Brazil,  Argentina,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay;  plus  bilateral  free-trade 
agreements (such as those linking  Chile and individual  G3,  Mercosur and  Andean Pact 
members).  If we add to this picture the multilateral system under the aegis of the World 
Trade Organization, everything points to an end to most trade protection problems by the 
end of  the century, on the American continent at least. 
In .this  context the main  obstacle to Chile's  full  membership  of Mercosur (the differing  . 
levels of protection) will gradually disappear and within the next ten years Chile is likely 
to accede formally  to the group,  which forms  a  natural  market for  its more advanced 
productive activities. 
APEC envisages a slower process in the Pacific (20 15 being the target date for free trade) 
but,  here  too,  bilateral  agreements  are  expected  to ·proliferate  (possible  agreements 
8 -Q~tween Chile  and  New  Zealand,- for  instance)  .. But  ~inee the. Asian·. c~untries have 
-J?91itical  and  economic  structures  that  are  very  different  from  Chile's,. the  integration 
process Will  probably take much longer than the:one 'it  is engaged in  on the American 
continent. 
(  . 
Chile's internatior:ml economic integration is taking place in _the context of  clearly defimible 
regional developments but the role of  relations With Europe, despite undeniably important 
economic, political and cultural ties, is less clear today.  ' 
'  '  -
.  .  .  . 
· If  the present trend continues, there will be a loosening ofboth commercial and economic 
ties  between  Chile  and  the· EU. ·  It is  desirable .  that  the  future  development  of the · 
.  institutional framework for those ties  should· help .correct this trend.  This  is  what both 
· parties want.  · 
.  .  . 
The Community's plan to  enter into  negotiatio~s with Mercosur, mainly with the aim of 
'  . con~luding an interregiorial agreement on trade and economic cooperation, leading in time 
to an interregional association,· could  .. reverse the trend and open up new perspectives for 
EU.:Chile relations.  .  . 
11.2  The' EU's strategic options. 
The  meetings  of the· ~o Group  have  highlighted  the  Community's  support  for  the 
integration process in Latin Aqterica, which the Community is ready to further by draWing 
on its own experience of  integration to provide institutional support and by promoting the 
reciprocal opening of  markets.  '  .  .  . 
On the  .. trade front,  the ED. intends to comply fully  with the liberalization measures laid 
down in the GATT agreements and with its obligations to the World Trade Orgaruzation, 
and Will avoid any treattnef!t that inay create discriminatory situations or trade defleCtions. 
Fu~ure relations between the EU and Chile inust develop in this context. and we have to · ·. 
examine the strategic options open to the EU at both interregional level. (in conrtection · 
with the negotiations with Mercosur) andiri direct bilateral relations with Chile.  · · 
A. Interregional options: EU-Mercosur-Chile . 
·.  Since it is likely  ~hat there will  soon .be  an.  association agreement and a-large degree of 
trade liberalization between Chile and Mercosur, leading to Chile's full mempership of  the 
group  in  the  medium  term,  the  EU's  negotiations  with  Mercosur  should  be  seen  as· 
. decisive for EU-Chile relations as-well .. · 
· The fact that Chil~ and  Mercosur are envisaging. only an assoCiation  arrangement rather 
than simple accession .at present means that a specific agreement between them is needed 
to ensure coordination of  the negotiations with the Community or to enable Chile to t8ke 
part in-the negotiations directly.  .  ·  . · 
Ey_ft:her points: 
....  .,_ 
.  ~  l  - • 
9 - SinceTelations with the EU are of  great importance for Chile, closer relations between 
the EU and Mercosur may well facilitate in tum the regional integration of Chile and 
Mercosur. 
- Taking on board specific Chilean interests· in the EU-Mercosur negotiations would not 
complicate these negotiations since Chilean exports to the Community are' less sensitive 
than those of  Mercosur and Community exports to Chile meet with fewer barriers than  l 
in Mercosur. 
- Non-commercial areas of  the EU-Mercosur negotiation (i.e. ipvestments and services) 
would also be of direct interest to, and easily applicable by Chile, which on the whole 
has a more liberal regulatory framework than the Mercosur countries. 
From the EUs point of view, the options that would over time be most in tune with the 
region's geopolitical developments are:  · 
Option Al - multiple-speed convergence 
Chile would take part in  the  negotiations with Mercosur but  each  area· of negotiation 
(political  matters,  trade,  cooperation,  investment,  etc.)  would  be  conducted 
independently. Political cooperation would, however, be full  and immediate (Chile taking 
part in the political meetings between the EU and Mercosur from the outset). As for trade, 
the timetable for negotiations. with  Chile  would  be aligned  on the  agreements reached 
between Chile and Mercosur. 
This  option  would  fit  in  with  the  EUs overall ·policy  to support  regional  integration 
efforts. 
Implementing it would entail stepping up the triangular EU-Mercosur-Chile consultations. 
If this option were taken up,  the Cormrtission would put forward  proposals to develop 
su~h a strategy after a thoroughgoing examination ofthe economic repercussions. 
Option A2 - joint negotiations 
If Chile  and  Mercosur  bring  forward  the  timetable  for  integration,  the  negottatmg 
directives  for  Mercosur  could  be extended  to  Chile  as  a  full  partner in  this  regional 
integration project. 
B. BILATERAL EU-CHILE OPTIONS 
Since both parties are politically in favoucof reviewing the 1990 framework agreement, it 
is worth seizing the opportunity to revise its provisions with a view to closer political and  · 
economic relations. The future developments clause in this agreement would allow us to 
extend significantly the areas of cooperation.  Thus, taking as  an example the provisions 
made for other partners at a level of economic development similar to Chile's, we could 
envisage the following operations using available budget funds: 
10 Economic  cooperation:  programmes  to .  consolidate  direct-investment  promotion 
efforts, agreements between firms, technology transfers;. a  stepping-up of  scientific and 
t"~hnical coop~nition, especially in the. fields  of  postgradu~te education and research 
.J(possible Chileari participation in Community cooperation programmes).  . .  ·  _ 
- Institutlonai  support:  programmes .designed  to  modernize  government  and  ease: 
Chile's  integration, within  Latin  America,  which· could  be  extended  to  cov~r ·an 
alignment of  legal systems and technical standards 'on' the basis of  mutual recognition. 
'·  EU-Chile ~ilateral relations could also be stepped up i~ the-political and trade_ a7enas. 
.  '  . 
})olitical cooperation: Chile and the EU share values such as democracy, human rights, the. 
mruntenance of  peace and the.roleofthe state in a market economy. Political cooperation 
within the Rio  Group  could thus be 'stepped up bilaterally and,  if Mercosur so  ~greed, 
Chile  could  also take part  in  the  EU-Mercosur  dialo~e. To this  end,  a joint political 
· declaration could be issued by Chile and the EU,  or~  by Chile, Mercosur and the EU, on . 
the lines of what is  being done to strengthen relations between the EU and other Latin 
American-partners. 
On trade~ other strategic options can be envisaged. 
The  options  set  out  above  represent  a  deepening -of  curren~ bilateral  relations.  This 
bilateral  approach  can  be  maintained  or  it  0aq  represent  a  stage  along  the  road  to 
· developing the interregional f~amework described under A . 
.  . Optio.n· Bl - active trade cooperatio~ 
This  strategy  would  entail  use  of the  future  developments  clause  of the  framework . 
agreement to introduce trade-related forms of  cooperation.  · 
Bilateral measures could .  thus usefully  ~ake economic  regulations less  stringent,  to the  . 
benefit  of trade.  (For  instance,  deregulation  of investment,  standards,· certification, 
sectoral dialogue and administrative practices.) 
Two concrete examples might be: 
a  conflict  prevention  procedure  (along  the  lines  of the  WTO's  proposed  new 
procedure); this would involve  an  early warning system which was compatible with 
and complemented the WTO's disputes settlement arrangements,. 
a formal  p'rocedural framework. for reciprocal information .concerning the respective 
Chile-Mercosur and EU-Mercosur negotiations  (shout~ the interregional options Al 
and A2 not be taken up).  .  : 
11 Option B2 - agreement on political consultation 
and economic partnership 
The above considerations concerning the extension of  technical and economic cooperation 
and the stepping-up of political dialogue are key elements of any agreement on political 
consultation and economic partnership. 
This option is the one that for the moment would seem to satisfY Chile's wishes. 
The trade provisions of  an EU-Chile partnership agreement could include the progressive· 
and reciprocal liberalization of  trade, taking account of  the sensitivity of  certain products 
and  ensuring  the  compatibility  of any  measures  with  the  Community's  international 
obligations, including its obligations to the WTO. 
The actual scope of such ~  agreement would probably not be so great in the long run, 
especially as large regional blocs are formed and with agreements tending to bring more 
and more trading partners under one umbrella. 
If  this option were adopted, the scope of, and arrangements for, trade liberalization would 
be set out in the negotiating directives for an agreement to replace the 1990 framework 
agreement. 
IlL  OPElRA TIONAL CONCLUSIONS 
In light  of the above,  and  in  accordance with  the  conclusions of the Essen European 
Council, the Commission· asks the Council to take a decision  <:>n  the strategic options set 
out in this communication. 
The Commission .will  wait  for  the  outcome  of the discussions  within  the  Council  and 
Parliament so  that they can be taken into account. in the proposals that it  will  then put 
forward as soon as possible. 
12 ANNEXl. 
· TliE EUROPEAN UNION IS CHILE'S MAIN TRADING PARTNER 
I.  Intensive trade relations 
Percentage of  Chile's total trade in  1993; 
-withEU .. 
-with USA 
- with Latin America 
-with Asia· 
':26% 
:18% 
:23% 
:22% 
2.  Direct investment in up-and-coming sectors · 
!  ' 
\  ' 
Percentages oftotal foreign direct investment in Chile's non-mining sectors, 1974 to 
1994 
-fromEU 
-from USA 
- from" Latin America 
-from Japan 
:44.3% 
:24.7% 
: 17.1% 
:  2.6% 
3.  Non-reciprocal aid support to improve living conditions·. 
Percentage of  the total of  non-refundable contributions received by  Chile~ 1990 to 
1994  . 
- fromEU 
-from USA 
-from Japan 
:65.7% 
·: ·6.1%' 
: 15.6% ANlliEXE  II  Chile's Trade  in  1993 
(uss·mii1ion) 
ExPorts·  Imports  Balance 
FOB  CIF 
- EU  2444. (2o%)  •2085  (19%)  ·~59 
I 
1860  (20%}  2457  (23%)  -597 
MER  CO SUR  . 1089  (12%)  1761  (16%)  -672 
JSA  1655  (18%)  2477  (23%)  -822 
Japan  1502  (16%)  883  (8%)  619 
Total  9416  10771  -1355 
-1  '-/ . ~984 
1'985 
. 1986 
1987 
'1988 
1.989 
1990. 
1991· 
1992 
-993 
1984 
1985 . 
.  I 
1986 
1987. 
·1988 
1989. 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Chiiean Exports:  DestiJ:iation 
(US$ .Million FOB)' 
Total.  Latin 
Expo  its  EU  USA  Japan.  ·America 
3657#"2  . 1060#" 7.  . 951,2 
3822,8  1226.,0  870,7 
4222,4  .~441.,3  915,2 
5101..,9  1.668',8  1140,5 
7048,7  259;1.,4  13.93,2 
81.92,7  2945,-4  1456,.0· 
8580,3  3203.,1  1469,2 
9048,4  2881.,3  1596,3· 
'. 
l.Ol.25.,5  2931,7  1.649,4 
9416.,2  2443,9  1655,2 
Chilean  Exports:  Destination 
(%  of total exports). 
407 ,·7 . 
392,5 
420,1· 
''561.,·3 
881.,2 
11.20,5. 
1.388,2 
1644,0 
i707  ,3· 
iS02;3' 
Latin 
USA  Japan  · America .  .  '  ------------------------------------
. 29·.,0  26,9  11,1  ,15,0 
32,1  22,8  10,3  14,5 
34,1  . 21 ( 7  9,9  17,0 
32,7  22,4'  11,0  17.,.."0 
. 36,8  19,8  12,5  13;1 
36 ,o  .·  17,8  13,7  12,2 
37,3  17,1  16,2  12,5 
31,8  17,6  . 18,2  14,4 
29,0  16,3  16,9  16,8 
26 ,·o  17',6  16,0  19,8 
550#"0 
554;9 
717_;3 
866  ... 5. 
925,0 
·996,1 
1074,8 
1.303,0 
1701.,7 
1.859~9 -:1.984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990. 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Chilean Imports:  origin 
(US$  Million CIF) 
Total  Latin 
Imports  EU  USA  .:fa pan  America 
------~---------------~----------------------
3480,5  626,7  747,8 
3006,4  439,9  654,6 
3156,7  588,7  64J.,s 
4023,3  912,8  773,·1 
4924,0  989 ,4.  1002,1 
6734,2  1327,9  1347,9 
7272,J..  1518,4  1373,4 
· 76ss;s  1407.,8  1581,9 
9670,2  1847,4  1984,9 
10771,4  2085,0  2477,4 
Chilean Imports:  Origin 
(%  of total imports) 
EU  USA  Japan 
18,0  21,5  9,0 
14,6  21,8  6,3 
18,6  20,3  9,4 
22,7  19,2  9,6 
20,.1  20,4  8,0 
19,7  20,0  10,.9 
20,9  18,9  7,8 
18,3  20,6  8,4 
19,1  20,5  10,0 
19,4  23,0 .  8,2 
312,7 
188,5 
296,4 
387,2 
391,8 
737,0 
568,4 
645,7 
964,7 
882,6 
Latin· 
Ame-r:-ica 
2~,9 
26,2 
23,4 
.23,8 
27,·7 
26,2 
23,4 
26,7 
25·,1 
22,8 
902,7 
787,6 
737,4 
955,7 
1364,4 
1764,2 
17~4,6 
2051_,3 
2423,0 
2457,1 Trade Balance:· Chile 
(Exports US$  Million FOB} 
(Imports US$  Million CIF) 
Trade  Latin 
'Balance  EU  USA  Japan  .America 
1984;  177.  434  203  95'  -353 
1985  816  78.6  ·216  204  -233 
1986'  1066  853  274  124  --20' 
1987  '1079  756  367  -174  "'-8~ 
1988.  2125  1602  391  489  -439 
1989  ,•  1459'  1618  108  384  -768 
1990  1308  1685  ·96  820  -630 
1991  1363  l.474  14  998  -748 
1992  ~455  1084  _:.336  . 743  \  -721 
1993  -1355  359  -'-822  620  -597 
! List of  first 50 products imported into the EC from Chil_e 
~  .1993 
(ECU'OOO) 
Total imports: 2 057 222  , Anne~·ill 
'' 
CN-beading  Value  · Share of total  T arifftreatment 
imports 
1  740:111 00  676.646  32,89%  zerodt!ty  Cathodes and sections of  cathodes  . 
2  260300 00  '  147.843  7,19%  zero duty  Copper ores and concentrates 
3  4703 2100  i15.9J4  5,64%  zero duty  Chemical wood pulp, soda or mlphate, (other 
than dissolving grades), seini-bleadted or 
7403 i9oo 
bleadted, of  conifers 
'4  .104.315  5,07"/o  zero duty  Refined oopper (not coming under 7403.11.00 
to 7403.13.00), wtWrought 
5  0806 10 15  100.045  4,86%  18%  Table grapes, fresh, from 1 November to 14 . 
July (except for the variety Emperor (Vitis 
vinifera cv.) from 1 December to 31 January 
6  71129000  6f.869  3,01%  zero duty  Waste and saapofpreciousmetal or of  metal 
clad with precious metal (not.  coming under 
7112 10 00 and 7112 20 00) 
( 
7  2301 20 00  61.371  2,98%  5%  Flours, meals and pellets, of  fish or of 
amtaceans, molluscs oi- other aquatic 
invertebrates, unfit for human consumptioo 
8  7108 12 00.  52.813  2,57%  zero duty  Gold (including gold plated with platinum). 
linwrougltt forms, noo-mooetary 
9  0303 7810  31.791  1,55%  15%  Hake ofthe gmusMer/uccius., frozen 
lO  260112 00·  30.234  1,47%  zero duty  lroll ores'  ami oonoentrates, except for roasted 
1i 
iron pyrites, pyrites cinder Agglomerated 
.  0808 10 89  30.108  1,46%  6%  Apples, fresh, from I April to 31. July 
(excluding  the varieties Golden Delicious and 
Granny Smith) 
.  12  .  4703 2900  24.984  1,21%  Zero duty  Chemical wood pulp, ~  or sulphate, (other 
than dissolving grades); semi-bleadted or 
bleadted, other than from conifers 
13  0808 20 33  23.632  1,15%  5%  Pears m>m 1 April to 31 July, fresh(*) 
14  0808 10 83.  21.512  1,05%  6%  Apples of  the variety Granny Smith, fresh, froni. 
I April to 31 July(*) 
IS  .  03026965  20.390  0,99%  15%  Hake, fresh or dtilled 
16  08109010  20.253  0,98%  11%  Kiwifiuit, fresh (*) 
17  26131000  18.511  0,90%  zero duty  Molybdenum ores and concentrates, roa!ted 
18  0811 20 31  .  16.461  0,80%.  18%  Raspberries,tmsweetened, including boiled or 
!teamed, frozen (*)  . 
19  29051100  15.528  0,75%  •13%  Methanol (methyl alcohol) · 
20  74020000  . 15.485  0,75%  zei.o duty  Unrefined copper: coppei- anodes for electrolytic 
refining 
21  1605 90 10.  13.200  0,64%  20%  Molluscs, Pr-ePared or prciserved 
22  71069190  12.942  0,63%  zero duty  Silver; including si1verplated witli gold or 
platinum, tmwrougbt, of  a fmeness of  not less 
than '999 parts per 1 000 
23  0303 2200  12.618  .  0,61%  2%  Atlantic salmoo (Salmo salar)  and·Danube 
'·  salmon (Hucho hucho), frozen(*) 
'24  030420 57  12.239  6,59%  15%  Fillets ofhake of  the genusMerluccius,  frozen 
25  2204 21  29  10.995  0,53%  4,5%  Wine, otherthait white wine, grape must with 
fermentation prevented or arrested by the 
· additiOn of  alcohol, with an alcohol content of  . 
13 % vol or less in rolrt.ainers with a content of . 
21 or less (excluding  those ofheading;; 2204 10 
26  1504 20 90'  10.380  0,50%  zerO duty 
11 to 2204 1 1  0), 
Fats aitd oils and theif fractions of  fiSh (except 
for fish-liver oils) not dtemically niodified 
27  0809 40 19  10.161  0,49%'  8%  Plums from 1 October to 30 Jtme, fresh (*) 
·28  2801 20 oo·  8.668  0,42%  zero duty  Iodine 
29  0808 20 31  8.577  0,42%  10%  Pears, from 1 J~uary  to .31  March, fresh(*) 
30  '2836 91 00  8.528  0,41%  6,2%  Lithium carbonates 
31  0303 7997  7.872  0,38%  _zero duty  Freshwater fiSh, fit for consumption, fro~ 
(*) Products likely to be considered sensitive 
j CN-heading  Value  Share of total  Tariff  treatment 
imports 
32  3102 so 10  7.822  0,38%  zero duty  .Natural sodiwn nitrate 
33  26080000  7.33S  0,36%  zero duty  Zinc ores and concentrates 
34  . IOOS  10 IS  7.1ll  0,3S%  zero duty  MaW: seed, simple hybrids 
3S  26169000  1.0S5  0,34%  zero duty  Precious metal ores and conoentrates, excluding 
silver ores and concentrates 
36  2834 21 00  6.869  0,33%  8%  Potassiwn nitrates 
37  !60S 10 00  6.855  0,33%  16%  Crab, prepared or  preserved 
38  03042013  6.64S  0,32%  2%  Fillets ofPacifui salmoo (Oncorhyn~hus  spp ), 
Atlantic sa  !moo (Salmo sa  lor) and Danube 
salmon (Hucho hucho) , fro21C11 
39  081120 59  6.351  0,31%  15%  Bladcberrics and mulberries, unsweetened, 
including boiled or steamed, fro21C11 (*) 
40  99909900  6.333  0,31%  4,9%  Desaiption ntt  yet available 
41  87084090  S.9S8  0,29%  6,9%  Gearboxes for single axle tractors, vehicles for 
trarn;porting I  0 or more persons, including the 
driver, saloon cars, vehicles for the transport of 
goods and special pwpose vehicles 
42  5101 11 00  S.8ll  0,28%  zero duty  Shorn wool, ott  carded or  combed 
43  0813 30 00  S.310  0,26%  8%  Dried apples(*) 
44  7112 10 00  S.198  0,25%  zero duty  Waste and scrap of  gold, including metal clad 
with gold but excluding sweeping'l containing 
dher  precious metals 
45  74091900  5.111  0,25%  6%  Copper pllllcs and sheets, refined, ntt  in coils, 
of  a thidcness exceeding0,15 mm 
46  2303 2011  5.110  0,25%  zero duty  Beet pulp, with a dry matter contmt of  ntt less 
than 87"A. by weigJrt 
47  0813 40 80  5.028  0,24%  6%  Dried fruit (excluding  those coming !Dlder 
heading'l080110 10to08082098and0813 
10 00 to 0813 40 60 (*) 
48  1605 2000  4.771  0,23%  20%  Shrimps, pn:pared or preserved 
49  0710 8090  4.761  0,23%  18%  Vegetables (ntt falling !Dlder heading'l 0710 10 
!Oto 0710 80 80) including those cooked by 
steaming or boiling in water), fro2JCil (*) 
50  7403 1200  4.619  0,22%  zero duty  Refined copper wire-bars 
1.820.018  88,47% 
(*) Products likely to be considered sensitive ~ 
\9 
.CHILI I EU TRADE (CLASSIFIED BY SECTION OF THE CUSTOMS TARIFF) 
1989  1990  1991  1992 
VALUE  %OF  1989  VALUE  %OF  ~  1989  VALUE.  %OF  1989  VALUE  %OF  . 1989 
;*<IMPORTS  MIOECU  TOTAL  100  MIOECU  TOTAL  100  MIOECU  TOTAL  100  MIOECU  TOTAL  100 
* CCTI  12736  46  1000  13654  5,2  1072  16806  66  131 9  145,83  6,0  1145 
·ecru  276,84  101  100,0  35713  137  129,0  45775  18,1  .  165,3  531  71  218  1920 
*CCTIII  19,26  7  1000  1013  4  52,6  1804  7  936  11 22  .5  582 
• CCT IV·  25415  92  1000  20692  79  814  18733  74  737  19300  80  76,3 
·ccrv  21385  78  100,0  187,16  72  875  24825  98  .  1160  .29455  121  1377 
• CCTVI  87,64  32  1000  7409  28  84,5  73,83  29  842  8377  34  955 
* CCTVII  53  1000  18  341  76  1422  . - ,80  .  1&>8 
* CCTVIII  324  1  1000  .  553  ·2  1706  219  ·;1  :  ~i  ~615  222  1  684 
* CCT IX  58,67 
.. 
21  1000  7193  28  122,5  6282  25  . 1070  4016  1 6  684 
•ccrx  103 40  38·  1000  106,40  4,1  1029  8918  35  862  13766  .  57  1331 
* CCTXI,  24 71  9  100,0  2643  1 0  106,9  2276  9  ,·  ,921  1862  8  753 
* CCTXII  173  1  100,0  4,69  ,2  2713  843  3'''4880 
.. 
454  .2  262,9 
* CCTXIII  ·  57  1000  ,73  128 7  87  1523  182  1  3192 
*CCTXIV  114,00  42  1000  122 74  47  ·106,8  102,44  41  891  9849  40  857 
* CCTXV  144439  525  100,0  125892  .48,3  .  871  1004 76  41  7  730  833,26  34,2  576 
* CCTXVI  2,59  1  100,0  687  3  2649  339  1  1306  457  . ,2  1764 
* CCTXVll  115  1000  3,78  1  327,3  1048  .  4  0085  626  ,3  542,6 
* CCTXVIII  179  1  100,0  344  . ,1  1921  1 41  1  78,7  3,10  1  1734 
* CCTXIX  08  1000  01  164  01  17 7  11  ' 
1354 
* CCTXX  129  1000  225  1  1749  314  1.  2442  5,40  ,2  419,8 
* CCTXXI  342  1  100,0  364  1  1063  344- 1  1005  688  3  2009 
•  " 
*IMPORT§.  TOT  2751  61  1000  1000  2608,12  1000  947  252835  1000  918  2434 73  1000  -884 
CCT Section  '1  Live animals; aDimai products 
CCT Section II  .  Vegetable products 
.  CCT Section III  Fats and oils 
CCT Section IV  . Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits t6baCC9 
CCT Section V  Mineral products  ' 
CCT Section VI'  · Products of the chemical or allied industries 
CCT Section VII  Plastics and ~cles  thereof; rubber and articles thereof · 
CCf Section VII  Raw hides and skins, leather, furs 
CCT Section IX  Wood and articles· of  wood; ·chim;oal; cork and articles of  cork; manufactures of straw 
CCT Section X  Substances used for the manufacture of  paper and articles thereof 
·  CCT Section XI  Textiles and iextile articles 
CCT.Section XII  Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, parasols, feathers, artificial flowers; fa,ns  . 1 
CCT. Section XJ;II  Articles of  stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, lnica or similar materials; ceramic products; glass and glassware 
CCT'Section XIV .  Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, pr~ious  metals,  imitation jewellery; coins 
CCT Section XV  Base metals and articles of  base metal 
CCT Section XVI  Machinery and mechanical appliances; and electrical. appliances 
CCT Section XVII  Means of  transport  ·  ·  .  . 
1993. 
VALUE  %OF 
MIOEcu·  TOTAl; 
12453  . 61 
34179  166  . 
1070  5 
12118  59 
21667  105 
61,09  3,0 
24 
125  1 
1942  9 
147 71  - 72 
1757  9 
4,47  2 
93 
- 13382  65 
82082  399'  -
574  3 
7,41  4 
281  1 
00 
4,00  2' 
653  3 
..  2007,22  1000 
I 
1~1 
100, 
9771 
1234' 
5651 
476 
101  3~ 
f!liJ7 
444 
. 366 
331 
1428 
711 
2587 
1635 
116,4 
568 
2213 
6420 
~ 1570 
63 
3805 
1008 
747 
CCT Section XVIII .  Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical inst 
CCT Section XIX 
CCT Section XX ' 
CCT Section XXI 
parts and accessories thereof 
Arlns and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  r 
Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques COOPERATION WITH CHILE  ANNEX IV 
Bndge!_Head!ng  ,_:.;~;::~~:l9:?1Hdi;3  !,,;i,:\(1991 :>;:·;,~:  :  ~-; <'r -1992·  .. _;;if,.':-2  '~~U.~-i!l~1993,~~~1 ,
1
·;  .  ····.:' ·1994- ..'  .:·. 
. 10.000.000  5.600.000 
f 
87-3010 
Financial and techni~lll cooperation  I 
98.180 
618.814  1.259.000  1.000.000  560.700  1.741.227 
_
1 
:~~~=~5 
.  ---- - --
1 
600.000-r-·  I 
1 
1.900.000 
1 
, 
1 
. 
1 
. 
1 
. 
1 
. 
1 
. 
1  1 
211.619  632.357  630.622  478.263 
.594.000  38.900 
2.530.000  1.525.278 
Democratization 
1.073.016  435.000 
Environmental protection 
I  ~~~~:!  forests  I  ·  I  · --1  ·  I  ·  I  ·  I  ·  I  ·  I  ·  I  I  ·  I 
4.996.689  4.954.338  ".499.668  4.846.303  3.841.873 
. NGOChlle 
N  I B7-5080  I  .  I  .  I  .  I  .  I  Lo74.38o  I.  2  I  tt!.8o9 I  I  I  8LOOO 
a ----
4.201.211  I  .  I  4.452.430  I  .  I  2.332.344  I  .  I  1.730.000 
I  :~;:~ency  aid  I  .  I  -, - l30.000 I 
1  I  .  I  I  .500.000  1-
1  I  .  I  .  I 
I  :i;~~::ainst Aids  ---,  •  I ----T 
89
.! 
00 I 
1  I  .  I  I 
423
.
000 I 
2  I  .  I  I 
'  2.610.886  3.264.209  3.999.781  2.806.558  4.596.871 
181.3.57  381.103  173.114  183.681  649.770 
Life sciences and technolo111es 
1.317.875  1.800.681  2.379.000  1.774.000 
oooeratlon on science nnd technolo 
I ~,;tlon-lntheenerptleld  I  ·  I  ·  I  ·  _I  ·  I  · ·  I  ·  I  u~.o,~ I·  ,  1  ·  1  ·  1 
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